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اسائنمنٹ ایل ایم ایس پر اپلوڈ کروائیں

اگر آپ تعلیمی نیوز، رجسٹریشن، داخلہ، ڈیٹ شیٹ، رزلٹ، اسائنمنٹ، جابز اور باقی تمام آپ ڈیٹس اپنے موبائل پر فری حاصل کرنا چاہتے ہیں۔ تو نیچے دیے گئے واٹس ایپ نمبر کو اپنے موبائل میں سیو کر کے اپنا نام لکھ کر واٹس ایپ کر دیں۔ سٹیٹس روزانہ لازمی چیک کریں۔

نوٹ: اس کے علاوہ تمام یونیورسٹیز کے آن لائن داخلہ بھجوانے اور جابز کے لیے آن لائن اپلائی کروانے کے لیے رابطہ کریں۔

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ASSIGNMENT NO. 2**Q.1 Discuss honour, power and agnatic rivalry in Pakistan. Support your answer with Akbar S. Ahmed reading.**

The roots of Pakistan's multifaceted problems can be traced to March 1940 when the All-India Muslim League formally orchestrated the demand for a Pakistan consisting of Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest and northeast of India. By asserting that the Indian Muslims were a nation, not a minority, the Muslim League and its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had hoped to negotiate a constitutional arrangement that provided an equitable share of power between Hindus and Muslims once the British relinquished control of India. The demand for a "Pakistan" was Jinnah's and the League's bid to register their claim to be the spokesmen of all Indian Muslims, both in provinces where they were in a majority as well as in provinces where they were a minority. Jinnah and the League's main bases of support, however, were in the Muslim-minority provinces. In the 1937 general elections, the league had met a serious rejection from the Muslim voters in the majority provinces.

There was an obvious contradiction in a demand for a separate Muslim state and the claim to be speaking for all Indian Muslims. During the remaining years of the British Raj in India neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League explained how Muslims in the minority provinces could benefit from a Pakistan based on an undivided Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan in the northwest, and an undivided Bengal and Assam in the northeast. Jinnah did at least had tried to get around the inconsistencies by arguing that since there were two nations in India-Hindu and Muslim-any transfer of power from British to Indian hands would necessarily entail disbanding of the unitary center created by the imperial rulers. Reconstitution of the Indian union would have to be based on either confederal or treaty arrangements between Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-majority provinces). Jinnah also maintained that Pakistan would have to include an undivided Punjab and Bengal. The substantial non-Muslim minorities in both these provinces were the best guarantee that the Indian National Congress would see sense in negotiating reciprocal arrangements with the Muslim League to safeguard the interests of Muslim minorities in Hindustan.

Despite Jinnah's large claims, the Muslim League failed to build up effective party machinery in the Muslim-majority provinces. Consequently the league had no real control over either the politicians or the populace at the base that was mobilized in the name of Islam. During the final negotiations, Jinnah's options were limited by uncertain commitment of the Muslim-majority province politicians to the league's goals in the demand for Pakistan. The outbreak of communal troubles constrained Jinnah further still. In the end he had little choice but to settle for a Pakistan stripped of the non-Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal and to abandon his hopes of a settlement that might have secured the interests of all Muslims. But the worst cut of all was Congress's refusal to interpret partition as a division of India between Pakistan and Hindustan. According to the Congress, partition simply meant that certain areas with Muslim majorities were 'splitting off' from the "Indian

union." The implication was that if Pakistan failed to survive, the Muslim areas would have to return to the Indian union; there would be no assistance to recreate it on the basis of two sovereign states.

With this agreement nothing stood in the way of the reincorporation of the Muslim areas into the Indian union except the notion of a central authority, which had yet to be firmly established. To establish a central authority proved to be difficult, especially since the provinces had been governed from New Delhi for so long and the separation of Pakistan's eastern and western wings by one thousand miles of Indian territory. Even if Islamic sentiments were the best hope of keeping the Pakistani provinces unified, their pluralistic traditions and linguistic affiliations were formidable stumbling blocks. Islam had certainly been a useful rallying cry, but it had not been effectively translated into the solid support that Jinnah and the League needed from the Muslim provinces in order to negotiate an arrangement on behalf of all Indian Muslims.

The diversity of Pakistan's provinces, therefore, was a potential threat to central authority. While the provincial arenas continued to be the main centers of political activity, those who set about creating the centralized government in Karachi were either politicians with no real support or civil servants trained in the old traditions of British Indian administration. The inherent weaknesses of the Muslim League's structure, together with the absence of a central administrative apparatus that could coordinate the affairs of the state, proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan overall. The presence of millions of refugees called for urgent remedial action by a central government that, beyond not being established, had neither adequate resources nor capacities. The commercial groups had yet to invest in some desperately needed industrial units. And the need to extract revenues from the agrarian sector called for state interventions, which caused a schism between the administrative apparatus of the Muslim League and the landed elite who dominated the Muslim League.

Power and Governance

Both the military and the civil bureaucracy were affected by the disruptions wrought by partition. Pakistan cycled through a number of politicians through their beginning political and economic crises. The politicians were corrupt, interested in maintaining their political power and securing the interests of the elite, so to have them as the representative authority did not provide much hope of a democratic state that provided socio-economic justice and fair administration to all Pakistani citizens. Ranging controversies over the issue of the national language, the role of Islam, provincial representation, and the distribution of power between the center and the provinces delayed constitution making and postponed general elections. In October 1956 a consensus was cobbled together and Pakistan's first constitution declared. The experiment in democratic government was short but not sweet. Ministries were made and broken in quick succession and in October 1958, with national elections scheduled for the following year, General Mohammad Ayub Khan carried out a military coup with confounding ease.

Between 1958 and 1971 President Ayub Khan, through autocratic rule was able to centralize the government without the inconvenience of unstable ministerial coalitions that had characterized its first decade after independence. Khan brought together an alliance of a predominantly Punjabi army and civil bureaucracy with

the small but influential industrial class as well as segments of the landed elite, to replace the parliamentary government by a system of Basic Democracies. Basic Democracies code was founded on the premise of Khan's diagnosis that the politicians and their "free-for-all" type of fighting had had ill effect on the country. He therefore disqualified all old politicians under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959 (EBDO). The Basic Democracies institution was then enforced justifying "that it was democracy that suited the genius of the people." A small number of basic democrats (initially eighty thousand divided equally between the two wings and later increased by another forty thousand) elected the members of both the provincial and national assemblies. Consequently the Basic Democracies system did not empower the individual citizens to participate in the democratic process, but opened up the opportunity to bribe and buy votes from the limited voters who were privileged enough to vote.

By giving the civil bureaucracy (the chosen few) a part in electoral politics, Khan had hoped to bolster central authority, and largely American-directed, programs for Pakistan's economic development. But his policies exacerbated existing disparities between the provinces as well as within them. Which gave the grievances of the eastern wing a potency that threatened the very centralized control Khan was trying to establish. In West Pakistan, notable successes in increasing productivity were more than offset by growing inequalities in the agrarian sector and their lack of representation, an agonizing process of urbanization, and the concentration of wealth in a few industrial houses. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, mounting regional discontent in East Pakistan and urban unrest in West Pakistan helped undermine Ayub Khan's authority, forcing him to relinquish power in March 1969.

Bangladesh Secedes

After Ayub Khan, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan headed the second military regime from 1969-1971. By that time the country had been under military rule for thirteen of its twenty-five years of existence. This second military regime emphasized the extent to which the process of centralization under bureaucratic and military tutelage had fragmented Pakistani society and politics. The general elections of 1970 on the basis of adult franchise revealed for the first time ever in Pakistan's history how regionalism and social conflict had come to dominate politics despite the efforts at controlled development. The Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, campaigned on a six-point program of provincial autonomy, capturing all but one seat in East Pakistan and securing an absolute majority in the national assembly. In West Pakistan the Pakistan People's Party, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had a populist platform that stole the thunder from the Islamic parties (the Muslim League, the oldest political party captured no more than a few seats) and emerged as the largest single bloc. The prospect of an Awami Leagues government was a threat to politicians in West Pakistan who in conspiracy with the military leadership prevented Mujibur from taking the reins of power. This was the final straw for the east wing who was already fed up with their under-representation in all sectors of the government, economic deprivation and then the suppression of the democratic process. An armed rebellion in East Pakistan engendered

all of these frustrations, which caused Indian military intervention to crush it. Pakistan was now involved in its third war with India, thus clearing the way for the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971.

The dismemberment of Pakistan discredited both the civil bureaucracy and the army, General Yahya Khan was left no choice but to hand all power over to the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) who saw the formation of a representative led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto's electoral strength, however, was confined to the Punjab and Sind, and even there it had not been based on solid political party organization. This, together with the PPP's lack of following in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, meant that Bhutto could not work the central apparatus without at least the implicit support of the civil bureaucracy and the military high command. The 1973 constitution made large concessions to the non-Punjabi provinces and provided the blueprint for a political system based on the semblance of a national consensus. But Bhutto failed to implement the federal provisions of the constitution. He relied on the coercive arm of the state to snuff out political opposition and by neglecting to build the PPP as a truly popular national party. The gap between his popular rhetoric and the marginal successes of his somewhat haphazard economic reforms prevented Bhutto from consolidating a social base of support. Thus, despite a temporary loss of face in 1971 the civil bureaucracy and the army remained the most important pillars of the state structure, instead of the citizens of Pakistan who were still struggling to be recognized in the democratic process. Although Bhutto's PPP won the 1977 elections, the Pakistan National Alliance—a nine-party coalition—charged him with rigging the vote. Violent urban unrest gave the army under General Zia-ul Haq the pretext to make a powerful comeback to the political arena, and on July 5, 1977 Pakistan was placed under military rule yet again and the 1973 Constitution was suspended.

Upon assuming power General Zia banned all political parties and expressed his determination to recast the Pakistani state and society into an Islamic mold. In April 1979 Bhutto was executed on murder charges and the PPP's remaining leadership was jailed or exiled. By holding nonparty elections and initiating a series of Islamization policies, Zia sought to create a popular base of support in the hope of legitimizing the role of the military in Pakistani politics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 caused Zia's regime to receive international support as a stable government bordering Soviet territory. Although Pakistan had now formally disentangled its self from both SEATO and CENTO and joined the nonaligned movement, was regarded by the West as an important front-line state and is a major recipient of American military and financial aid. Despite a string of statistics advertising the health of the economy, murmurs of discontent, though muffled, continued to be heard. On December 30, 1985, after confirming his own position in a controversial "Islamic" referendum, completing a fresh round of nonparty elections of the provincial and national assemblies, and introducing a series of amendments to the 1973 constitution, Zia finally lifted martial law and announced the dawn of a new democratic era in Pakistan.

This new democratic era was just as turbulent as Pakistan's previous political history. Major political parties called for a boycott the 1985 election due to the non-party bias platform. In absence of political parties the candidates focused on local issues that superseded the majority of the candidates' affiliations to particular

parties. The Pakistani people were obviously interested in participating in the democratic process and disregarded the urge to boycott, 52.9% cast ballots for the National Assembly and 56.9% cast ballots for the provincial elections.

President Zia first initiative was to introduce amendments to the 1973 constitution that would secure his power over the parliamentary system. The eighth amendment turned out to be the most detrimental to the people's faith in the democratic system. Now the president could possess complete control and power to take any step, which he felt was necessary to secure national integrity. For the next twelve years the presidents used this amendment to expel a number of prime ministers from their post, mainly due to either personal struggles or insecurity over shift in power.

Following the 1988 election, Muhammad Khan Junejo was nominated as the prime minister, who had a unanimous vote of confidence by the National Assembly. Junejo seemed to be a promising component to the Pakistani government; he fostered a smooth transition from the army to civil authority, which generated optimism about the democratic process of Pakistan. For the first of his years in office, Junejo was able to strike a balance between establishing the parliamentary credentials as a democratic body and maintaining President Zia's blessing. He developed the five-point program that aimed at improving development, literacy rate, eliminating corruption and improvement of the common man's lot. He was as well improving foreign policy abroad and was grappling a major budgetary deficit from the heavy expenditure of the martial law regimes. But on May 29th 1988 President Zia dissolved the National Assembly and removed the prime minister under the article 58-2-b of the Constitution. He claimed that Junejo was conspiring against him in order to undermine his position; he blamed the National Assembly of corruption and failure to enforce Islamic way of life.

The opposition parties were in support of Zia's decision because it worked in their benefit, providing an early election. They demanded elections to be schedule in ninety days in accordance with the constitution. President Zia interpreted this article of the constitution differently. He felt he was required to announce the election schedule in ninety days while the elections could be held later. Simultaneously he wanted to hold the elections on a non-party basis as he had in 1985, but the Supreme Court upheld that this went against the spirit of the constitution. Political confusion ensued as a result of Zia's proposal to postpone the elections to re-structure the political system in the name of Islam. There was fear that Zia may impose martial law and the Muslim League became split between supporters of Zia and Junejo. All of this was stalled when Zia died in a plane crash on august 17th.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan was sworn in as president being the chairman of the Senate and elections were initiated. Which surprised to outside observers who feared that the military could easily take over power. The November elections of 1988 were based on political party platforms for the first time in fifteen years. None of the parties won the majority of the National Assembly but the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the single largest holder of seats. Benazir Bhutto, the PPP's chairperson, was named prime minister after the PPP formed a coalition of smaller parties to form a working majority. At first people were hopeful that Bhutto would work together with

the opposition party's leader Nawaz Sharif of the IJI party, who headed the Punjabi party, the majority province. But soon they escalated bitterness to new heights and drained the economy with bribes to other politicians to sway affiliations. These accounts plus no improvement on the economic front scarred the central government's image. In 1990 the President dismissed Bhutto under the eighth amendment of the constitution, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. So once again elections were held a short two years later.

The Pakistani people were losing faith in the democratic system. They felt it was corrupt, haphazard and based on the squabbles of the military and bureaucratic elite. This attitude was reinforced by the fact that Nawaz Sharif was assigned prime minister in 1990, and dismissed in 1993 even though he had liberalized investment, restored confidence of domestic and international investors, so that investment increased by 17.6%. And as a result the GDP had a growth rate of 6.9% while the inflation stayed under 10%. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was accused of conspiring with Benazir Bhutto in the dismissal of Sharif. For the first time in Pakistan's history the Supreme Court declared that the dismissal of the National Assembly and Sharif unconstitutional, reinstating Sharif and the National Assembly. This act showed that the president was not the overriding power but the events that followed proved how unstable the government was. Through bribes and palace intrigues Ghulam was able to influence a rebellion in Punjab in 1993, which represented Sharif and his party as incompetent. This situation caused an upheaval in the system that resulted in intervention of the chief of Army Staff General, Abdul Waheed Kaker. It was agreed that both the president and prime minister would resign and new elections would be arranged.

An even lower turn out affected the legitimacy of the all too frequent electoral process. In this election the mandate was divided by the same players, the PPP with Bhutto and the Muslim League with Sharif. Sharif had lost the popular support in Punjab, which caused the PPP to claim the majority of the seats. So once again the PPP claimed the majority of the seats and Bhutto was placed as prime minister. She was able to get Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari elected as president, which secured her government against the eighth amendment. Regardless Bhutto was unable to run a just government; she fell back into corruption, misuses of state resources, which was detrimental to the Pakistani people. Both the Chief Justice and President wanted to maintain the autonomy of their position in the government, while Bhutto was attempting to override the political system. President Leghari soon dismissed her with the support of the Supreme Court. The public hailed this decision and in February 1997 prepared for new elections, the fifth in twelve years. The voter support for the elections waned proportionately throughout these twelve years.

It was obvious that the two leading parties were alternating public support when Sharif and the Muslim League were reinstated as the Prime Minister and majority party respectively. The Muslim League used its parliamentary majority to enact a fundamental change in the political system with the introduction of amendments thirteen in the constitution. The thirteenth amendment limited the power of the president to that of a nominal head of state, while restoring the parliament as the central governmental power. This amendment basically created a check and balance procedure to article eight, in an attempt to maintain political stability. By

1999 the eighth amendment was stripped of the constraints that empowered the president to dissolve the National Assembly or dismiss the prime minister. These legislative feats were impressive, but overall the Muslim League's performance was mixed. They inherited a lot of obstacles, an economy that was on the verge of collapse and a political culture of corruption. The May 1998 decision to conduct nuclear tests in response to India's nuclear tests resulted in the imposition of sanctions that stifled the economy even more so. Bhutto's corrupt usage of foreign funds and the freezing of foreign investments further complicated investment relations.

Q.2 Write a detailed note on political leadership among Swat Pathans.

Swat is a 120-mile-long valley setting. The 400,000 densely-settled residents of the Swat valley are a group of Pashto-speaking Yusufzai Pathans. There is intensive grain cultivation through capital-intensive artificial and natural irrigation. Land is valuable and is held in common by a lineage; each male adult has claim to a share of lineage land, which is subject to periodic reallocation (wesh). Leadership is secured by land ownership but depends on lavish hospitality and reckless spending to hold a clientele.

3: Underlying Frameworks of Organization

Barth here returns to detail the three "underlying frames of organization" that he introduced in the introduction

1. spatial/territorial: locality = Swat »» regions (13 @ 20-30,000) »» "local areas" »» village groups »» villages (@ 500-10,000) »» wards (@ 200-500, @ unit of admin and mosque) »» houses (@ 40-80 of economically-independent elementary families)

A village will thus have a diverse group of persons: Pakhtuns and their tenants, other rival Pakhtuns and their tenants, Saints and their tenants and dependents. In each ward will be at least one men's house, the social, recreational, and political center

2. castes (Qoum): roughly ten major patrilineal, hereditary, ranked occupational groups, conceptually endogamous, but without religious importance and not forming localized communities

3. patrilineal descent groups (khel): segmentary but not corporate (23-30). Although this is strictly true for only the 1/5 of valley residents who are Pakhtuns, their clients are aligned with their leader's genealogy

4: Neighborhood, Marriage and Affinity

The above three frameworks are more or less ascriptive, but there were also another set of relations that were achieved—those of neighborhood and association and marriage and kinship. The former are organized mainly through local associations for life-cycle rituals, and the latter by marriage contract.

Barth details in the chapter the teletole associations (all permanent residents of a ward who associate for Moslem life-cycle rituals—e.g., circumcision, marriage, funerals—providing mutual assistance) and marriage contracts and rituals.

5: Relations of Inequality and Authority

Barth turns here to the overtly “political” groups with more overtly political character, which also differ from above in being internally hierarchical and based on dyadic contractual relations with a leader.

- (a) economic contracts—six main types, including land tenancy and agriculturalists and craft specialists
- (b) house tenancy contracts—i.e., landowners own houses in proportion to their land, so most villagers must rent
- (c) the men’s house—which serves as a meeting house and dorm
- (d) Saints and their followers—Saints are not leaders of men’s houses, but their followership is a structural equivalent. Saints are expected to use their religious standing to keep/make peace, and for that they are given land by Pakhtuns.

The following chapter finishes setting the scene by describing the organization of local communities, and the subsequent chapters show how the leaders of these contractual groups manipulate their positions to build followings.

6: Land Tenure and Political Relations Within Local Communities

This chapter, in effect, shows how the above principles of organization interconnect in a local framework, fundamentally tied by land. See 65-67 for details of the wesh system, whose administrative machinery was the jirga or village assembly, right to speak in which was held by the landowners. It is this chapter in which Barth really begins to describe political dynamics.

69: ‘within such a framework of ideas, let us adopt, for a moment, the point of view of the non-landowners.’ He then analyzes their “choices” within constraints.

7: Authority and Following of Chiefs

The potential authority of chiefs derives predominantly from control of land. “Though land they gain control over house tenants, occupational contract holders and land tenants, and other dependents; while from it they reap the profits which enable them to enlarge their followings by giving feasts and gifts in their men’s houses. Furthermore, chiefs gain authority by defending their honor, particularly through blood revenge; but this activity is largely a personal matter and falls outside the field of alliance” (108)

The valley is divided into the “satisfied men” and the “hungry men.” This is the context for the significance of hospitality and gifts. A chief will give away hundreds of times the income necessary for his own family subsistence.

Generosity must be complemented by a leader’s reputation for bravado and impetuosity and a sense of honor and a willingness to revenge. One speaks in the jirga for oneself but also for clients; thus, it is a political forum for demonstrating power and influence. There was a strong value on personal honor, on defense of one’s interests, impetuous bravery. Feuds in defense of honor both require a following and give one the reputation to attract a following--for whom a khan leader can offer security, hospitality (men’s house), and land. Khan assemble clienteles of cultivator-tenants and craft specialists. These khan, however, must necessarily compete with one another for followings and for land--thus there is some room for leverage for non-Pakhtun. Thus, these ties are more contractual than merely dominant/submissive; they are that too, but Barth’s point is that everyone is trying to maximize.

89-91: “the general form of a chief’s following”: see this description

8: Authority and Following of Saints

He notes there are a great variety of Saints, ranging from recluses to minor landowners to headmen and rulers of villagers. "A majority of saints live as minor landowners in villages dominated by chiefs" (95) Yet the category has very definite social meanings, and “the main sources of political influence and authority of Saints are their control of land, their role as mediators and their reputation for morality and holiness” (92).

A control of land (92-96): In Cyrenaica, the Sanusi were given land along the borders, in a sense “outside” the structure; in Swat, the Saints instead are given the inferior land and the more difficult-to-control villages

B their role as mediator or arbitrator (96-99)

C their reputation for holiness and piety (99-102)

102-103: “the general form of a saint’s following”: Barth describes this as a series of concentric circles, beginning with his close agnatic kin and dependents (land); then wider circles of the territory through which they are spread and his role as mediator is effective; out to the farther reaches of his reputation for holiness.

9: Alliances and Political Blocs

Note the logic of the book above. In that sense, this chapter, the longest in the book, is really its central chapter, the “second main step in the synthesis”: “that of showing how the combination or opposition of these smaller groups creates the actual political organization of the valley. This requires a description of the kinds of relationship which imply mutual political support, and, conversely, the kinds of structural situation that imply opposition between leaders” (104).

That is, the elemental unit is a leader and his followers (which is a “politically corporate group”), and “the striking feature of the political organization of Swat is the emphasis on free choice and contract.” However, such units do not exist by themselves, but rather in combination; in fact, they tend to be “aligned in two grand dispersed political divisions or blocs” (a gloss for dela suggested to him by Martin Southwold), which is itself the result of a series of alliances among local leaders, who consider themselves equals (unlike the blocs that are relations of leader-followers) of mutual assistance and strategic advantage.

An alliance is a mutual support contract between two leaders; while Swat is acephalous and segmentary, there is none of the branching fusion and fission that E-P describes for the Nuer; these alliances are fixed and relatively permanent. What develops then is a “two-party system” up and down the valley (106), although at the end of the book he claims that he has not been able to treat adequately the reasons why no more than two blocs develop (134).

108-109: discusses which categories of persons are apt to be rivals and which make typical allies.[Sharpest lines of cleavage are between close patrilineal kin; agnates are more often rivals and enemies than allies.]

115-118: on the hierarchy of public assemblies, which are the major forums for the wider blocs, including an actual case (117-118, which Jacobson also discusses) alliances are made between Pakhtuns .

Barth goes on to consider the use of force and concludes with a section on “the position of leaders in the blocs” (124-126). That is, the bloc is a political alliance of more-or-less equals; centralized control requires clientage, and thus structurally the blocs do not yield to a centralized Khanate.

10: History and Organization of Swat State

A “native state” emerged between 1917 and 1926 within the pre-existing framework and using (and continuing to use) this pre-existing structure of political leadership. Its ruler, an ex-"Saint" now with the title of the Wali, now controls the upper 2/3s of the valley; he is recognized by the British and treated roughly as the rajahs of British India. Barth sees this as an unusual development, still vulnerable and tentative.

129-132: Barth describes the formal organization of the Swat State and its three constituent units of administration, army, and taxation

11: Conclusion

In the brief, three-page conclusion, Barth turns to the two contrasting styles of leadership offered by the chiefs and the Saints, in which "pride, rivalry, and virility" are bases of chiefly reputation and admiration, and “moderation, reasonableness, and meekness” are authoritative qualities of Saints. This leads, though, to a complementarity. The followings of chiefs and Saints tend to cross-cut one another, but the two opposed blocs contain both kinds of leaders.

Barth closes by reiterating how different this pattern of persisting opposed blocs of chiefs and their followers is to the situational fissioning and fusing on multiple levels in other segmentary systems like the Nuer (whom he doesn't cite here nor take up elsewhere in any detail).

Q.3 Discuss kinship, marriage and the relationship between man and woman in Pakistan.

Pakistani social life revolves around family and kin. Even among members of the most Westernized elite, family retains its overarching significance. The family is the basis of social organization, providing its members with both identity and protection. Rarely does an individual live apart from relatives; even male urban migrants usually live with relatives or friends of kin. Children live with their parents until marriage, and sons often stay with their parents after marriage, forming a joint family.

The household is the primary kinship unit. In its ideal, or extended, form, it includes a married couple, their sons, their sons' wives and children, and unmarried offspring. Sons establish separate households upon their father's death. Whether or not an extended household endures depends on the preferences of the individuals involved. Quarrels and divisiveness, particularly among the women (mother-in-law and daughters-in-law), can lead to the premature dissolution of a joint household.

Descent is reckoned patrilineally, so only those related through male ancestors are considered relatives. The biradari, or group of male kin (the patrilineage), plays a significant role in social relations. Its members neither hold movable property in common nor share earnings, but the honor or shame of individual members affects the general standing of the biradari within the community. A common proverb expresses this view: "One does not share the bread, but one shares the shame."

In theory, members of a biradari are coresidents of a single village. In some areas, however, land fragmentation and generations of out-migration have led to the dispersal of many members of the biradari among various villages, regions, and cities. Patrilineal kin continue to maintain ties with their natal village and enjoy the legal right of first refusal in any biradari land sale.

Members of a biradari celebrate the major life events together. Patrilineal kin are expected to contribute food and to help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth, marriage, death, and major religious holidays. The biradari has traditionally served as a combined mutual aid society and welfare agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families.

There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to maintain good relations with one another. Biradari members who quarrel will try to resolve their differences before major social occasions so that the patrilineage can present a united front to the village. People with sons and daughters of marriageable age keenly feel the necessity to maintain good relations because a person whose family is at odds with his or her biradari is considered a poor marriage prospect.

Although descent is reckoned patrilineally, women maintain relations with their natal families throughout life. The degree of involvement with maternal kin varies among ethnic groups and among regions of the country. The tie between brother and sister is typically strong and affectionate; a woman looks to her brothers for support in case of divorce or widowhood early in her marriage. In those regions where families maintain considerable contact with maternal kin, children, even though they are members of their father's patrilineage, are indulged by their mother's kin. Just as a family's relations with its biradari are considered in evaluating a potential spouse, so in these regions may the mother's kin be assessed.

Marriage is a means of allying two extended families; romantic attachments have little role to play. The husband and wife are primarily representatives of their respective families in a contractual arrangement, which is typically negotiated between two male heads of household. It is fundamentally the parents' responsibility to arrange marriages for their children, but older siblings may be actively involved if the parents die early or if

they have been particularly successful in business or politics. The terms are worked out in detail and are noted, by law, at the local marriage registry.

Marriage is a process of acquiring new relatives or reinforcing the ties one has with others. To participate fully in society, a person must be married and have children, preferably sons, because social ties are defined by giving away daughters in marriage and receiving daughters-in-law. Marriage with one's father's brother's child is preferred, in part because property exchanged at marriage then stays within the patrilineage. The relationship between in-laws extends beyond the couple and well past the marriage event. Families related by marriage exchange gifts on important occasions in each others lives. If a marriage is successful, it will be followed by others between the two families. The links thus formed persist and are reinforced through the generations. The pattern of continued intermarriage coupled with the occasional marriage of nonrelatives creates a convoluted web of interlocking ties of descent and marriage.

A woman's life is difficult during the early years of marriage. A young bride has very little status in her husband's household; she is subservient to her mother-in-law and must negotiate relations with her sisters-in-law. Her situation is made easier if she has married a cousin and her mother-in-law is also her aunt. The proper performance of all the elaborate marriage ceremonies and the accompanying exchange of gifts also serve to enhance the new bride's status. Likewise, a rich dowry serves as a trousseau; the household goods, clothing, jewelry, and furniture included remain the property of the bride after she has married.

Marriage also involves a dower, called haq mehr, established under Islamic law, the sharia. Although some families set a symbolic haq mehr of Rs32 in accordance with the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, others may demand hundreds of thousands of rupees.

A wife gains status and power as she bears sons. Sons will bring wives for her to supervise and provide for her in her old age. Daughters are a liability, to be given away in an expensive marriage with their virginity intact. Therefore, mothers favor their sons. In later life, the relationship between a mother and her son remains intimate, in all likelihood with the mother retaining far more influence over her son than his wife has.

Gender reflects the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that are considered apt for men and women in any society. Mostly the terms gender and sex are not differed and taken as closely related terms. Sex relates to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women while gender refers to cultural differences rather than biological ones between men and women. Male and female are sex categories while feminine and masculine are gender categories.

According to a Gilani Research Foundation survey carried out by Gallup Pakistan (april 27, 2009), majority of the Pakistani males and females have distinct roles to play in the society. In the recent years although women's status and role has been uplifted beyond being a housewife, the priority is still given to men in politics, education, employment, and related walks of life.

Dr. Rakhshinda Parveen (n.d.) expresses that the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan dictates equal rights for men and women. However, men are more equal than women in reality. The reality shows women in

lower status than men in every sphere of life whether it's education, food, health care or freedom of choice of partner. According to the Human Development Report 1999 of UNDP, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) rank of Pakistan among 185 countries is 100. This rank determines the empowerment of women on a country basis. This measurement results in unequal status of women in economic resources, participation in political decision-making and economic decision-making. In spite of the fact that the Holy Quran dictates the equal rights for women wellbeing and development, women have always been the main target of rights violation in the Muslim countries. The typical subjugated image of Pakistani women reflects the centuries old patriarchy deeply rooted in the sub-continent. Although, emancipation and empowerment has always been documented in the legal documents, this has not come to the reality to its full extent yet.

The two fundamental perceptions establish the gender relations in Pakistan that women are inferior to men and that a man's honour is determined by the actions of women of his family. In the Muslim societies, women bear the honour of the family name. To ensure that honour, they are not supposed to dishonor their families, their mobility is limited and they have restrictions on their behavior and activities and have very limited contact with the opposite sex. Women are constrained to have "Purdah" (veil) to restrain their protection and respectability. "Purdah" creates physically and symbolically different spheres for men and women by separating their activities. Mostly women spend their time at home to do homely tasks and go out only for serious and approved reasons. Social life generally revolves around the activities of men in society. In the most parts of the country, except in Islamabad, Karachi, and wealthier parts of a few other cities, those families are considered shameless who do not restrict their women. "Purdah" is practiced according to the family tradition, class and rural or urban residence but men and women do not mix freely anywhere without serious reasons. The most extreme restraints can be found in parts of the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, where women are not allowed to almost leave the house before they get married and are not allowed to meet the unrelated men and they cannot contact with their male cousins on their mother's side, because these men are not classed as relatives in a strongly patrilineal society. In the rural areas of Punjab and Sindh, gender relations are relaxed because women are equally responsible with men for transplanting, rice seedlings, weeding crops, raising chickens and selling eggs. When a family aspires a higher status, it entails stricter 'purdah' as a first social change. (Jone Johnson Lewis, 1994)

Some urban women, residing in the close-knit communities in the old cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, generally wear a burqa (fitted body veil) or a "chadar" (loosely draped cotton cloth used as a head covering and body veil) when they leave the homes. They usually live in a multistory (havelis) building constructed to accommodate large extended families. The places where people do not know their neighbours, there are less restrictions on women's mobility.

Reversal of Gender Roles

In the modern times, the old perceptions of a patriarchal society are destabilized that has shifted the earlier unequal power dynamics between males and females and has resulted in the empowerment of women over men.

The traditional gender roles have given a way to totally reversed roles to reserve the rights and emancipation of women. Now a days, wives are earning as much as 20% more than their husbands in the whole world that dictates the changing power dynamics that shows that women have got the power to harness the economic power upsetting the old traditional patriarchal beliefs. Traditionally, the women used to need physical protection and economic stability provided by men to save their submissiveness. (Kandiyoti,1988). The traditional patriarchal hierarchy has been shattered and resulted in females patronizing their male counterparts in courtship. Modern women have become more educated and successful, that education and awareness has empowered women resulting in displacing men from their gendered position in society. The emergent trend of educated women out-earning their partners has led to changes in social perceptions and household roles. It has gradually shifted the institutionalized and privileged status of males in society. If women become the breadwinners, the domestic order shifts automatically to men because there is not any other option and this can give both men and women a sense of purpose and identity.

Alongside the empowerment of women, the emasculation of men redefines the masculinity and femininity which has determined the gender activities of society. Men, who have become domestic, have redefined the masculinity by entitling them as “providers” who provides not only economically but also emotionally and logistically. The traditional notion of masculinity of a father has been limited to begetting protecting and providing for children. The difference between what is masculine and what is feminine is what is determined by the gender roles adopted by both the genders. However, by bearing the role of childrearing and household chores, the masculinity of males comes into question that results in confusion in the individual male’s social identity. As a result, unemployed husbands preserve their masculinity by claiming that they are still provider if not economically but emotionally as they spend more time with their children than their own fathers. (Liza Mundy, 2011)

Deccan Herald (2012) conducted a research to study the effects of massive social changes on gender relations. The study has found that men today want babies and commitment, while women are more likely to want independence in their relationships. The study was conducted on over 5,000 American adults and the results revealed that more than half of the single men wanted to have children as compared to just 46 percent of women. The results showed the effects of the growing gender role reversal.

History of Gender Roles Reversal

The gender ideologies have changed since 1970s. Women became aware of their rights and emancipation with the emergence of feminist movement in 1970s. In 1960, 19 percent of married women with young children were in the paid labour force (U.S. bureau of the Census 1999). By 1998, the ratio of working women was up to 64 percent. This movement of mothers into the work places in the time span of 40 years left a profound effect on the attitudes towards the working women in the public and private spheres. The most of the American men approved and expected their wives to be active in working outside homes as the paid labour force. At the same

women are more receptive for women participation in working places than they were in 1970s. The nostalgia for breadwinner/homemaker family can still be found but more in men than women. Although some men resent the constricted definition of masculinity that narrows their role as economic providers, they stick to their roles as emotional providers among their children. (Teresa Ciabattari, n.d.)

A minority of U.S men resisted changes in women's roles that could result as harmful for children and family life. These rapid changes in the roles of women have resulted in the widening gap between men's and women's attitudes. There is a larger gender difference in attitudes than it was 25 years before. (Teresa Ciabattari, n.d.)

Reversal of Gender Roles in Pakistan

Gender roles have not been altogether revolutionized in Pakistan but have still been treading the way to transform. The contemporary socio-political and economic conditions in Pakistan are restrained in the paradigm of patriarchy and capitalism. The envoys of women rights movements have been shouting out loud the revolution in the gender roles that has resulted in women working in every field of life. Women have come out of their spheres at home to take part in the tread of progress but they have instigated some initial stages yet and have a long way to trek on. (Pak Tea House, 2012) The women of Pakistan had confronted great challenges in the early 1990s such as increasing practical literacy, gaining access to employment opportunities at all levels in the economy. This development promoted a change in perception about women's roles in society. Women status in society gained public voices from within and outside the political process.

The twentieth century has seen various attempts to bring social and legal reforms to improve the Muslim women's lives in the subcontinent. Islam has played very important role to develop the rights of women since partition.

Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century introduced women education to ease some of the restraints on women's activities to ensure women's rights under Islamic law. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan organizes the Mohammedan Educational Conference in the 1870s to endorse modern education for Muslims, and he founded the Muhammadan Anglo- Oriental College. Many of the early proponents of education improved the status of women education by initiating cooking and sewing classes initially in a religious framework to advance women knowledge and skills. Still the literacy rate was very low as in 1921, there were only four out of every 1,000 Muslim females were literate. (countrystudies.com, n.d.)

Different organizations have been developed for the betterment of women's rights. The Gender and Development (GAD) was introduced as a replacement to the Women in Development (WID) approach. Both organizations aspire to construct the gender equality and tackle the subordination of women in the home and in the public sphere. WID was established in the late-1970s, when it was acknowledged that women were left at the sideline in the process of development and progress of country. WID tended to examine women in isolation while GAD developed the female gender roles maintained by many facets of society, community, economy and not least of all, men. Gad aims to empower women to increase women self esteem, to encourage women organizations. (Jenny Mason, 2009). GAD challenges the social norms which dictate the women subordinate

position to men. The educational gender gap in Pakistan is the result of the specific historical, political and cultural forces. (Jafar, 2002)

Q.4 Write notes on the following;

(i) Social Power in Pakistani Villages

Throughout Pakistan, as in most agrarian societies, family organization is strongly patriarchal, and most people live with large extended families, often in the same house or family compound. The eldest male, whether he is the father, grandfather, or paternal uncle, is the family leader and makes all significant decisions regarding the family and its members. Traditionally, a woman's place in society has been secondary to that of men, and she has been restricted to the performance of domestic chores and to fulfilling the role of a dutiful wife and mother. However, in the Punjab, cotton picking is exclusively a woman's job, and women may keep the money thus earned for their own purposes.

In wealthy peasant and landowner households and in urban middle-class families, the practice of keeping women in seclusion (purdah) is still common; when women leave their houses, they typically cover their heads. Among the rural poor, women have duties on the farm as well as in the house and do not customarily observe purdah. Houses of those who practice purdah have a men's section (mardānah) at the front of the house, so that visitors do not disturb the women, who are secluded in the women's section (zanānah) in the rear. Women's subordinate status in Pakistan also is evident in the practice of "honour killings," in which a woman may be killed by a male relative if she is thought to have brought dishonour on the family or clan.

Among the wealthiest Pakistanis, Western education and modes of living have eliminated purdah, but, in general, even among that group, attitudes toward women in society and the family often have been viewed by outsiders as antiquated. Change has occurred most rapidly among the urban middle-income group, inspired by increasing access to the West as well as by the entry of women into the workforce and into government service. An increasing number of middle-class women have stopped observing purdah, and the education of women has been encouraged. Some women have gained distinction in the professions; some of Pakistan's leading politicians, journalists, and teachers have been women, and a woman has served as prime minister and as speaker of parliament. Pakistani cuisine also has affinities with that of India. Curry dishes are common, as are a variety of vegetables, including potatoes, eggplant, and okra. Each region (and, often, each household) has its own preferred mixture of spices—the term masala is used to describe such a mixture. In addition to the many spices that are also associated with other countries of South Asia, yogurt is a common ingredient. Favourite meats include chicken, mutton, and lamb. Lentils are a standard dish, and various types of wheat bread are the national staple. The most common breads are chapati (unleavened flat bread) and naan (slightly leavened). Pakistanis drink a great deal of hot tea (chai), and lassi (a type of yogurt drink), sherbet, and lemonade are popular. As in most Muslim countries, alcoholic beverages are considered culturally inappropriate, but there are several domestic breweries and distilleries.

Muslim Pakistanis celebrate the two major Islamic holidays, 'Īd al-Fiṭr (which marks the end of Ramadan) and 'Īd al-Aḍḥā (which marks the end of the hajj), as well as the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (the religious holidays are based on a lunar calendar and vary from year to year). Mohammed Ali Jinnah's birthday (December 25) is a celebrated holiday. Independence Day is August 14, and Pakistan Day is March 23 (celebrating the Lahore [Pakistan] Resolution of 1940). There are a number of other major and minor holidays.

(ii) Women's roles and status in Pakistan

Violence against women is a problem around the world. Addressing the issues of physical and sexual violence against women has been a complicated endeavor for criminologists. Much of the traditional criminological research on violence against women has frequently focused on rape as a crime of power between individuals. However, this framework has been expanded to incorporate the analysis of rape during times of war and rape as a state crime. In these cases, rape serves a broader purpose within the military and social structure. By focusing on the specific case of the gang rape of Mukhtar Mai, the goal of this paper was to demonstrate and analyze the role of the state in many of these crimes. Mukhtar Mai's case should not be understood in isolation, but as a way to illuminate the role of the state in these numerous crimes. The status of women in Pakistan is one of systemic gender subordination even though it varies considerably across classes, regions, and the rural/urban divide due to uneven socioeconomic development and the impact of tribal, feudal, and capitalist social formations on women's lives. In modern Pakistan, women have held high offices including that of the Prime Minister, Speaker of the National Assembly, Leader of the Opposition, as well as federal ministers, judges,^[5] and serving commissioned posts in the armed forces. Major General Shahida Malik, attaining the highest military post for a woman. Many religious groups in Pakistan, who have had more political power since the Zia-ul-Haq regime in the 1980s, advocate subordination of women in Pakistan. Even rape victims have not been allowed to use DNA evidence to prove their cases, however the All Pakistan Ulema Council recently issued fatwas denouncing "honour killings". Other improvements are also being made as Lahore has inaugurated its first service of lady traffic wardens to manage the traffic and the country's most conservative province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is planning to increase the percentage of women in the police force.

Even with these improvements, rampant domestic abuse and a high rate of child marriages and forced marriages still remain. Pakistan has a dual system of civil and sharia law. The Constitution of Pakistan recognizes equality between men and women (Art. 25(2) states "There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex") but also recognizes as valid Sharia law.

According to Saira Banu;

Women are not only playing vital role in family life but also women's have become important part of Pakistani society in professional carriers in profession life women's are still facing great difficulties but there some examples who gives strength to come forward and do some thing good about our country one of the example we have about Mohtharma Benazeer Bhutto she was a first women elected to lead a Muslim state having twist been Pakistan prime minister (1988_1990) and (1993_1996) she had a great political background

and her efforts for the survival of our nation is unforgettable being a woman she did so many works for the prosperity of nation .that proves the reality that women can do something very better than a man for a society and for a nation as well Women's of Pakistan are greatly contributing their parts in struggling for the prosperity of nation in every field we are seeing that women are working more efficiently in all fields as we are expecting it from a man but in big cities of Pakistan it is possible that women can work equally as like all man does even we seeing now a days in media in politics women's are more active and so many educated girls wants to make their professional carriers but in ruler areas of Pakistan the situation is entirely different Women's of ruler areas are facing terrible situations due to the many problems first of all our basic problem is that our country has been counted in under-developing nations and our literacy rate is very low so its obvious that the difficulties are created by the lack of education our women's and girls are not educated and in small cities and villages families are very conservative they don't allow their women's and girls to go for education according to them women's are made for controlling house hold and man's are responsible for the expenses of house. Women's position in Pakistani society are getting damage as the time passes some of problems are listed below . These are the practises which women's are performing forcibly to do

- Child marriage(in traditional language it is called (Vani))
- Watta satta (It is tribal custom in which brides are traded between two clans)
- Honor killing(it is punishment for a women)
- Marriage to Quran (Man does this in order to keep the land of their sisters and daughters)
- THROWING ACID (for destroying women's beauty)

These problems are unavoidable they doesn't allow women's to come forward do something great for our nation as compare to the women of big cities they are playing tier role efficiently they are doing jobs and taking education from higher institutions their conditions are entirely different from village life of women's Educations achievement of female students are much higher in rate than male students in cities and If we talk about women employment patterns of women employment vary throughout the Muslim world as of 2005,16 % of Pakistani women were economically active either employed or unemployed .Although Pakistani women's are playing great role in nations economy their contributions have been under-reported in some censuses and surveys in a gross manner. Our religion Islam allows women to get education and even for the employment as well but in our country some conservative people are not allowing their women's to come forward and do something for their house society and country if all all the women of our country get education and if they become independent that will become a great cause of success for a nation Women s plays important role in Pakistani society if basic facilities will be provided to them she will change the current terrible situation of our country through their efficiency and handwork no doubt our nation has so many hard-working ladies who are not only running their house society but also our countries economy.

Q.5 Write a critical review on the prescribed reading 'Return Migration and Female Headed households in Rural Punjab' by Hastings Donnan.

Nevertheless, evidence indicates that the country's varied and worsening environmental scarcities interact with the structure and operation of the Pakistani state to trigger processes that heighten ethnic, communal, and class-based rivalries. This combination of forces encourages resource capture, the marginalization of the poor, rising economic hardship, and a progressive weakening of the state. These processes, in turn, culminate in increased group-identity (for example, inter ethnic) and deprivation conflicts, particularly in the country's urban areas.

Rapid population growth and degradation of a nation's environmental resources may impair its economy, disrupt its social relations, and destabilize its political system. These stresses can cause civil or even international strife. Today, such conflicts appear likely in certain parts of the developing world where growing populations with rising expectations struggle to sustain themselves on a dwindling resource base.

Some commentators view the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as increasingly vulnerable to environmentally-induced conflict. They argue that with a population growth rate that ranks among the highest in the world, a declining resource base, and growing evidence of societal strife, environmental and demographic stresses are already destabilizing Pakistan.

However, there has been no adequate investigation of whether and how population growth and scarcities of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests, and freshwater (which we refer to here as "environmental scarcities"), contribute to the intensity and extent of violence within Pakistan. In general, commentators assert rather than demonstrate causation; they ignore other variables – some long associated with the onset or perpetuation of conflict in the country – and they do not specify the precise causal processes by which scarcity produces violence.

Identifying these linkages is a daunting task in part because of severe data limitations. Nevertheless, a systematic investigation of the nature and sources of environmental scarcity and of its societal effects in Pakistan yields important insights.

This paper first examines the character of the Pakistani state, its political and economic development, and the tensions which have historically marked Pakistani society. It then turns to the issue of environmental scarcity, examining its nature, its social impacts, and the degree to which linkages between scarcity and conflict exist in Pakistan.

We conclude that environmental scarcity rarely if ever acts as the sole cause of conflict. Other variables – most notably the character of the state, its development, its policies, and its relationship to the society at large – not only have increased environmental degradation, but also have interacted with environmental scarcity to generate social instability and conflict. We show that, together, these forces are triggering resource capture, marginalization of poor groups, rising economic hardship, and a weakening of the state. This interaction is heightening ethnic, communal, and class-based rivalries that have long plagued Pakistani society. This

conjunction of pressures increases group-identity and deprivation conflict as groups turn to violence as a means of addressing their mounting grievances.

These conflicts are increasingly urban in character. Environmental scarcity is now a major contributor to the rapid expansion and fractionation of the urban population and to the growing inability of the state to meet this population's demands. Within the Pakistani urban context, opportunities for competition among rival groups rise, struggles over scarce urban resources mount, and grievances proliferate. Yet as the relative capacity of the state erodes, means of addressing grievances and nonviolent channels for expressing them are less and less available. The result in Pakistan is a persistent escalation of urban violence.

Lasting solutions to this turmoil will require fundamental reforms in the Pakistani state and its policies. In their absence, strife will increase and could eventually contribute to regional instability.

In theory, Pakistan is a federal polity, committed to Islamic religious principles and parliamentary rule. The executive consists of a prime minister, who heads the government, with a president acting as chief of state. The legislative branch is bicameral and consists of a popularly elected National Assembly and a largely advisory Senate, elected indirectly by members of the provincial assemblies.⁸

Yet the “practice” of truly democratic and representative politics has proven elusive. Nonelected institutions hold sway over their elected counterparts, and the state has long been dominated by a military and bureaucratic elite dedicated to advancing its own interests largely to the exclusion of those of society at large.

The contours of Pakistan's “bureaucratic-authoritarian” state emerged soon after independence in 1947, as the challenges of nation building threatened to overwhelm the modest resources of the newly created country. Almost overnight, enormous social dislocations arising from partition, pressing defense requirements, and the need to assert authority over newly acquired and disparate territories confronted the state machinery with demands it could not meet.

Partition had yielded Pakistan 18 percent of the population, 17.5 percent of the financial assets, less than 10 percent of the industrial base, and slightly over 7 percent of the employment facilities of an undivided India.⁹ Organizational machinery was inadequate – particularly in the regions the regime acquired – and the largely migrant political leadership had little direct contact or rapport with the indigenous population of the lands it inherited.¹⁰

The pressing need to consolidate territory and defend the nation prompted a rapid expansion of administrative machinery and wholesale adoption of the colonial British “vice regal” system of administration and resource management. This system had been long geared to maintaining law, order, and the collection of revenues on behalf of the British Empire. It included a professional civil service with a deep knowledge of local conditions as well as great access to and influence over provincial populations.¹¹ It was an effective tool – and one readily available to the new Pakistani regime – for augmenting state revenues and financing burgeoning defense budgets.

Military influence within the society expanded apace. The outbreak of war with India over the northern princely state of Kashmir only months after independence, lingering doubts over provincial loyalties to the newly formed state, and the internal dislocations and communal conflicts that attended independence all gave the military a critical role in the creation and maintenance of the state. Defense spending became a top priority and – along with the cost of civil administration – accounted for more than three-quarters of the federal government's budget during the first decade after independence.¹² This spending was soon supplemented by western aid, as Pakistan adopted the role of junior guardian of the Persian Gulf in the Cold War.¹³

Yet there was little corresponding effort to ensure the supremacy of elected institutions within Pakistani society. Administrative/bureaucratic influence over the state rapidly increased, and democratic institutions decayed. By the late 1950s, the civil-military bureaucracy had consolidated its hold on the government,¹⁴ and the country settled into a mode of state rule that remained largely unchanged for the next three decades. A succession of military and civilian regimes followed, and while each professed some commitment to greater political participation, all ultimately fell short of popular expectations. Elites often opted for a controlled form of democracy; they saw politics less as a participatory affair than as something to be steered from above.¹⁵

Recently, however, this pattern appears to have changed. After more than seven years of civilian-led government, some analysts now speak of a trend toward greater democratization of Pakistani politics.¹⁶ There has been a routinization of some key elements of a democratic system, including more frequent general elections, somewhat more robust political parties, and a freer press. Nevertheless, nonelected institutions continue to have great power. The first prime ministerial tenure of Benazir Bhutto and that of her successor, Nawaz Sharif, were both, in effect, terminated following clashes with members of the permanent government.¹⁷ In short, while the grip of bureaucratic authoritarianism may have loosened, its final demise is a distant prospect at best.¹⁸

Character of the Pakistani Regime

Burdened by an over developed civil-military bureaucracy and exceedingly weak elected institutions, the Pakistani government has long been marked by a lack of accountability. Power and expertise are highly concentrated and largely reside in nonelected institutions and their supporters. Politicians often serve as junior partners in state rule, sometimes providing a cloak of legitimacy for the actions of the permanent government, and at other times acting as lightning rods to deflect popular criticism as bureaucrats run the nation from behind the scenes. Not surprisingly, rule by executive ordinance has dominated legislative action, and coercion has frequently eclipsed negotiation in federal-provincial deliberations.¹⁹

Meanwhile, institutional avenues for broad-based popular expression have remained weak. Although general elections have occurred more regularly in recent years, they were infrequent for much of Pakistani history. The first general election based on a broad franchise took place in 1970, a full 23 years after independence. Political parties are still poorly evolved; they resemble movements and factions that do not generally articulate national goals and concerns.²⁰ Banned by government at various points in the nation's history, their precarious existence

encourages them to adopt narrow political platforms, often appealing to the aspirations of particular ethnic and religious groups.²¹

Economic development has generally reflected the attitude that prevailed during the colonial period, stressing efficient resource exploitation, rapid economic growth, and state profit over conservation and human welfare. Over the past five decades, the country has witnessed the emergence of a profusion of low-cost, high-polluting industries governed by few environmental guidelines.²² Similarly, during the 1960s agriculture began to stress techniques intended to boost short-term production, often at the expense of long-term sustainability.

Despite relatively impressive GNP growth rates (currently about 6 percent a year), economic returns have been largely directed toward meeting defense, debt-servicing, and administrative costs while neglecting human development. Improvements in the social well-being of the population have been marginal. Long ranked among the lowest in the world in terms of human development, the country lags in such areas as infant mortality, education (particularly for females), and the alleviation of poverty.²³ Social services are poor and often funded through foreign aid. Today, approximately 31 percent of the population live in absolute poverty, infant mortality stands at 95 per thousand live births, and 65 percent of the adult population aged 15 and over is illiterate.²⁴

Meanwhile, strong traditions of environmental consciousness have been absent, both within government and in society at large. Environmental legislation has been weak or nonexistent. While adoption of the Environmental Protection Ordinance in 1983 marked the country's first explicit attempt to deal with the environment, governmental practice often does not reflect the spirit of the legislation, and efforts to improve the environment continue to confront old mind-sets, political gridlock, and institutional weakness.

Underlying the system's lack of political accountability and its developmental approach is a state structure deeply penetrated by powerful vested interests. In the years following independence, alliances among the state bureaucracy, large landowners, and a nascent industrial bourgeoisie were secured through patronage and bribes. Thereafter, the interests of the state and its supporters largely took precedence over all else. Dominated by a mainly Punjabi elite, the political and economic system concentrated power and investment in the western half of the country, to the great disadvantage of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

Ownership of land and industry remains highly concentrated, and it lies mainly in the hands of the bureaucracy and its supporters.²⁵ Meanwhile, land grants, lucrative defense contracts, permits, loans, licenses, and jobs are awarded on the basis of personal contacts and the ability to perform political favors rather than on the basis of merit. Over time, such practices have become accepted as necessary and inevitable ways of conducting business, both within and outside government. Today, a culture of greed and an absence of civic-mindedness pervade Pakistani society.

The political and economic system has resulted in some extension of privilege. However, more often than not, this extension is a result of elites' use of state resources to co-opt rivals and dissipate the potential challenges they pose. In the face of provincial discontent and threats of secession, the regime offers development money to provincial elites in exchange for political stability.²⁶ Similarly, favors are conferred upon industrialists and

commercial entrepreneurs to shore up loyalties. Combined with the narrow sectional politics encouraged by weak representative institutions, these elite tactics cause greater segmentation of society along lines of class and ethnicity, as well as a debilitation of organized opposition to elite interests.